








































The Impact of Banking Sector Stability
on the Real Economy
Pierre Monnin and Terhi JokipiiThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the 
Swiss National Bank. Working Papers describe research in progress. Their aim is to elicit comments and to 
further debate.
Copyright ©
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) respects all third-party rights, in particular rights relating to works protected
by copyright (information or data, wordings and depictions, to the extent that these are of an individual
character).
SNB publications containing a reference to a copyright (© Swiss National Bank/SNB, Zurich/year, or similar) 
may, under copyright law, only be used (reproduced, used via the internet, etc.) for non-commercial purposes 
and provided that the source is mentioned. Their use for commercial purposes is only permitted with the 
prior express consent of the SNB.
General information and data published without reference to a copyright may be used without mentioning 
the source.
To the extent that the information and data clearly derive from outside sources, the users of such information 
and data are obliged to respect any existing copyrights and to obtain the right of use from the relevant 
outside source themselves.
Limitation of liability
The SNB accepts no responsibility for any information it provides. Under no circumstances will it accept any 
liability for losses or damage which may result from the use of such information. This limitation of liability 
applies, in particular, to the topicality, accuracy, validity and availability of the information.
ISSN 1660-7716 (printed version)
ISSN 1660-7724 (online version)
© 2010 by Swiss National Bank, Börsenstrasse 15, P.O. Box, CH-8022 Zurich1
The Impact of Banking Sector Stability on the
Real Economy 
Pierre Monnin a,∗, Terhi Jokipii b
aSwiss National Bank, Financial Market Analysis, Boersentrasse 15, 8022 Zurich,
Switzerland
bSwiss National Bank, Financial Stability, Bundesplatz 1, 3001 Bern, Switzerland
Abstract
This article studies the relationship between the degree of banking sector stability
and the subsequent evolution of real output growth and inﬂation. Adopting a panel
VAR methodology for a sample of 18 OECD countries, we ﬁnd a positive link be-
tween banking sector stability and real output growth. This ﬁnding is predominantly
driven by periods of instability rather than by very stable periods. In addition, we
show that an unstable banking sector increases uncertainty about future output
growth. No clear link between banking sector stability and inﬂation seems to exist.
We then argue that the link between banking stability and real output growth can
be used to improve output growth forecasts. Using Fed forecast errors, we show
that banking sector stability (instability) results in a signiﬁcant underestimation
(overestimation) of GDP growth in the subsequent quarters.
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The increased incidence of banking and ﬁnancial crises over the last quarter
century has triggered an active research agenda, not only on the underlying
causes of crises, but also on their impact on the real economy. Literature in
this ﬁeld has been mainly focussed in two directions: ﬁrst, on understanding
links between banking sector characteristics and long term growth and, sec-
ond, on quantifying the costs of banking sector crises in terms of real output
losses. In the ﬁrst strand of research, Levine (1997, 2001) demonstrates the
link between the openness of the banking sector and economic growth. Several
other authors (Levine, 1997, 1998, Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000, King and
Levine, 1993a,b, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, Rajan and Zingales,
1986) have highlighted that the degree of development in the ﬁnancial sector
acts as an important contributor to economic growth. 1 The second strand
of research reaches a clear conclusion: banking crises have usually coincided
with, or preceded, a substantial economic slowdown (see among others Hog-
art, Reis, and Saporta, 2002, Boyd, Kwak, and Smith, 2005, Serwa, 2007,
Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel, 2007, Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan,
2008). The literature is however, far less clear regarding whether or not the
banking sector is the main trigger of the economic slowdown, as it is diﬃcult to
separate cause and eﬀect in the ﬁnancial sector real economy nexus (Kamin-
sky and Reinhart, 1999, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997, 2005, Hilbers,
Otker-Robe, Pazarbasioglu, and Johnsen, 2005). These empirical conclusions
have prompted an increased interest in both policy makers and academics to
assess, from a theoretical point of view, the extent to which macroeconomic
policies and banking system soundness depend on one another (Benink and
Benston, 2005, Gupta, 2005, European Central Bank, 2006, Deutsche Bundes-
bank, 2006, Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos, 2006).
This paper clearly belongs to the second strand of research. Indeed, we are
not concerned by the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on long term growth,
but rather by the (possibly transitory) impact of banking sector instability
on real output growth. We are also not interested in investigating the events
at the roots of banking sector instability per se, and thus we take banking
sector instability as given, without examining its causes. One ﬂaw of the stud-
ies cited above in the second strand of research is that they focus solely on
the loss in output growth during or after banking crises, ignoring the banking
sectors impact during more stable times. 2 The main reason for this is that
many authors have chosen to work with binary dependent variables (crisis
vs. non crisis). However, several drawbacks are associated with adopting this
approach. First, bank crises are relatively rare events. Second, the choice of
1 This literature is reviewed in Levine (2004).
2 One exception to this is Ranci` ere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008) who shows a positive link
between average growth and banking sector instability.3
threshold for deﬁning a crisis is highly discretionary. Finally, binary variables
impose the unrealistic assumption that a banking sector that is not experi-
encing a crisis is necessarily healthy. The focus on crises vs. non crisis periods
has consequently resulted in a lack of research into the impact of the banking
sector on the real economy in less extreme times. It remains unclear whether
’normal’ reductions in banking sector stability – i.e. a level of instability that
can regularly be observed but that does not translate into a banking crisis –
have a signiﬁcant impact on growth. 3
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by empirically assessing whether
the degree of banking sector stability has an impact on the real economy in
non extreme times. In particular, we are interested in determining whether a
period of banking sector instability is followed by reduced real output growth
in the subsequent quarters. We measure banking sector stability based on the
banking sector’s probability of default. This measure has the advantage of
being continuous by nature and thus captures a continuum of states, rather
than classiﬁcation as either crisis or non crisis. This contrasts with the bi-
nary variables approach usually adopted in this context. In contrast to other
distance-to-default measures previously used, our measure allows for a time-
varying volatility for banks assets. Following Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos,
and Zicchino (2007), we explore the impact of banking sector stability on real
output growth and inﬂation rates in the subsequent quarters with a panel vec-
tor autoregressive model 4 . Our sample consists of quarterly data for 18 OECD
countries over the 1980-2008 period. The novelty of our set-up is that it allows
the variance of output growth to be dependant of the state of the banking sec-
tor. This captures the impact of banking sector instability on output growth
as well as on its uncertainty.
Our results can be summarized as follows: banking sector stability is an impor-
tant driver of future GDP growth. Periods of stability are generally followed
by an increase in real output growth and vice versa, a ﬁnding which appears
to be driven predominantly by periods of relative instability rather than by
periods of stability. In addition, we show that banking sector instability is
followed by higher uncertainty about output growth.
The link between banking sector stability and economic activity is of particular
interest to policy makers which base their monetary policy decisions on eco-
nomic forecasts. Research focussing on understanding whether ﬁnancial stabil-
ity should be considered in the setting of monetary policy has investigated the
3 For example, consider a banking sector which suﬀers credit losses in a business cycle downturn
but which is still able to function without external help. The stability of such a banking sector has
clearly decreased after credit losses, but since it is still functioning, it is not in a fully ﬂedged crisis
either.
4 Allenspach and Perrez (2008) study interactions between the banking sector and the real
economy for Switzerland via a VAR approach, however it is a single country study that does not
make use of the panel VAR methodology adopted here.4
informational advantages of the central bank, and in particular whether bank
related information can be used to improve macro forecasts. Peek, Rosengren,
and Tootell (1999, 2003), Romer and Romer (2000) show that incorporat-
ing conﬁdential supervisory information about bank health improves central
bank forecasts of both unemployment and inﬂation, and that in fact, the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) consider this information when setting
monetary policy. We contribute to this literature by extending our analysis
further and investigating the results uncovered thus far. In particular, our re-
sults indicated an apparent importance of banking sector stability on output
growth. We continue by assessing whether additional information embedded in
our stability index might help to improve output growth forecasts. Using Feds
forecasts data, we show that banking sector stability (instability) results in a
signiﬁcant underestimation (overestimation) of GDP growth in the subsequent
quarters. This ﬁnding indicates that additional information embedded in our
stability measure has the potential to further improve economic forecasts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes our measure
of banking sector stability. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 esti-
mates the impact of banking sector stability on output and inﬂation. Section
5 explores the relationship between banking sector stability and central bank
forecast errors. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stability index for the banking sector
2.1 Banking sector stability: deﬁnition and assumptions
We deﬁne the instability as the probability of the banking sector becoming
insolvent within the next quarter. Hence, a lower probability corresponds to
greater stability and vice verse. We consider a banking sector to be insolvent
if, at the end of the quarter, the market value of the assets owned by all the
banks of a country is not suﬃcient to repay its total debt (i.e. if at time t+1,
the total assets At+1 of the banks are smaller than their total debt Dt+1). This
approach makes the implicit assumption that the banking sector of country i
is equal to a single bank, computed as the the aggregate of the balance sheets
of banking institutions in that country. Our measure therefore abstracts from
any comptetiveness considerations.
To compute the default probability of the banking sector i at time t,t w o
elements are required: the distributions of both the asset value and of the debt
value at the end of the period, conditional on their initial values at time t.
With these two distribution functions, we are able to compute the probability
that, at time t + 1, the asset value falls below the debt value.5
We assume that the asset value of the banking sector follows a geometric
Brownian motion characterized by:
dAt = μAtdt + σtAtdw (1)
where μ is the instantaneous growth rate of assets, σt is their instantaneous
volatility rate and dw is a Wiener process. We also assume that, between t
and t+1, debt grows at the (continuously compounded) growth rate r, which
implies the following one-period transition function:
Dt+1 = Dte
r (2)
2.2 Default probability and distance-to-default for the banking sector
To estimate the default probability of a ﬁrm (i.e. of the aggregate banking
sector in our case), Merton (1974) suggests considering the ﬁrm’s equity as a
call option on its assets. Merton’s method is based on the idea that if, at debt
maturity, the value of the ﬁrm’s assets is smaller than its debt, then the ﬁrm
cannot repay its debt and becomes insolvent. In this case, the ﬁrm’s equity is
worth zero. If the assets are greater than the debt, then the ﬁrm repays its
debt and the market value of the ﬁrm is equal to the diﬀerence between the
asset value and the debt. Thus Merton’s model states that, at debt maturity
(i.e. t + 1 in our case), the ﬁrm’s equity is equal to:
max(At+1 − Dt+1,0) (3)
By assuming, as stated in section 2.1 that At is log normally distributed and
that debt is insured, 5 Merton (1974) shows, using the Black-Scholes option
pricing formula, that the initial price Et of the banking sector’s equity is:







where Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution.
Note that Φ(dt) in equation (4) corresponds to the probability of exercising the
option (i.e. the probability that the assets At+1 are greater than the debt Dt+1).
Therefore, the probability of default (i.e. the probability of not exercising the
option) is equal to 1−Φ(dt). One can show (see Bichsel and Blum, 2004) that
dt measures how far, in terms of standard deviations, the banking sector is
5 This assumption implies that bank’s bonds will yield the risk free rate even in case of default
for the bank.6
from its default point (i.e. the point where assets are equal to debt). This is
why dt is often called the distance-to-default.
Concretely, for the rest of our analysis, we will not work with the default
probability directly but we will rather use the distance-to-default dt.N o t e
that these two measures are equivalent since they are linked by a strictly con-
tinuously decreasing function. A lower distance-to-default always implies a
higher probability of default. The distance-to-default measure has the advan-
tage of being unbounded, which is convenient for empirical estimations. The
default probability on the other hand, is bounded between zero and one.
To compute the distance-to-default with equation (5), we need to know the
asset market value At, its volatility rate σt and the debt Dt. In practice how-
ever, only debt is directly observable. To obtain the asset market value, and its
variance rate we make use of equation (4) which links the unobserved assets
with the observed market capitalization of the banking sector (i.e. its equity
value Et).
2.3 Estimation of the distance-to-defaults with equity market value
Duan (1994, 2000) shows how to estimate the unobserved evolution of the
asset value and its variance making use of the observed evolution of market
capitalization. In his original paper, Duan (1994, 2000) works with a constant
variance; we extend his method to estimate a time-varying variance.
We start by rewriting equation (1) to get the one-period transition density of
At, which is equal to:
ΔlnAt+1 = μ − σ
2
t/2+ωt (6)
where ΔlnAt+1 =l nAt+1 −lnAt and ωt is white noise with variance σ2
t. Fur-









The unknown parameters are θ = {μ,κ,α,β}. Duan (1994, 2000) makes use
of the fact that for any given set of parameters θ, equation (4) is a one-to-one
mapping between Et and At. The parameter set θ can therefore be estimated
by maximizing a log likelihood function deﬁned on Et instead of on At. Duan

































where ˆ At is the unique solution to equation (4) for Et, given that the param-
eters θ and ˆ dt correspond to dt with ˆ At instead of At. Note that the three last
terms on the right-hand side of the previous equation would correspond to the
log likelihood functions of a GARCH process if the asset value were directly
observable. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the equation corrects this
traditional log likelihood function to account for the fact that we must obtain
the asset value At from the observable equity price Et via equation (4). The
maximization of the log likelihood function can be performed with ordinary
maximization techniques.
3D a t a
Our dataset consists of debt and market value data between 1980Q1 and
2008Q4 for a sample of 521 banks covering 18 OECD countries. 6 All data are
obtained from Datastream. The debt data are annual and have been trans-
formed into quarterly data by linear interpolation. The quarterly market value
is the minimum of daily market values observed during the quarter. 7
In addition to the data used to calculate the distance-to-default index for each
country, we make use of GDP real growth and inﬂation between 1980Q1 and
2008Q4. The seasonality component in price movement is removed using the
X12 method in Eviews.
Figure 1 presents the estimated distance-to-defaults for each country. We as-
sume that in each country, banking sector stability is measured by the relative
size of distance-to-default deviations from its own historical mean. In other
words, an unusually unstable banking sector corresponds to a distance-to-
default that is substantially below the country historical mean. The horizontal
lines represent the ﬁrst and third quartiles of the distance-to-defaults of all
6 We selected countries that joined the OECD before 1975 and that are classiﬁed as high-
income countries by the World Bank. These countries are Australia (17 banks), Austria (10 banks),
Belgium (12 banks), Canada (10 banks), Denmark (52 banks), France (47 banks), Germany (32
banks), Greece (21 banks), Italy (50 banks), Ireland (5 banks), Japan (110 banks), Norway (32
banks), Portugal (9 banks), Spain (23 banks), Sweden (7 banks), Switzerland (33 banks), United
Kingdom (14 banks) and United States (37 banks). Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands
and New Zealand have been excluded because we could not get data for at least 5 banks.
7 We additionally experiment by using the average market value observed during the quarter.
However the results are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected and are therefore not presented here for brevity.8
countries. These quartiles are used in Section 4.2 to deﬁne the thresholds of
stability on which we base our assessment. We deﬁne three possible states for
the banking sector: unstable, stable and very stable. We consider a banking
sector to be unstable if its distance-to-default is in the ﬁrst 20
Figure 2 shows the number of countries with an unstable banking sector in
each period. We can observe four periods in which at more than third of the
countries simultaneously experience instability in their banking sector: 1987Q4
(Black Monday and the following stock market crisis), 1990Q1 – 1993Q2 (hous-
ing crises in several countries), 1998Q3 (Russian and LTCM crises) and in 2008
(subprime crisis).
4 Impact of banking sector stability real output growth and inﬂa-
tion
In order to assess whether banking sector stability is linked to real output
growth and inﬂation we adopt a panel autoregression (pVAR) approach with
state-dependent variance. We make use of a pVAR approach predominantly for
the reason that the interactions between ﬁnancial distress and the real econ-
omy have not been rigorously identiﬁed theoretically. Using a VAR therefore
allows us to impose as little a priori theorizing as possible. Moreover, a panel
VAR, when compared to a traditional VAR approach, allows us, by using cross
sectional data, to increase the number of observations and thus the precision
of our estimations. This is particularly useful in our context since episodes of
banking sector instability are relatively rare. The choice of a state-dependent
variance derives from a preliminary analysis showing that the residuals of a
simple pVAR were heteroscedastic. Thus, in addition to studying the impact
of banking sector stability on the levels of GDP growth and inﬂation, our
framework allows us to explore its impact on both GDP growth and inﬂation
uncertainty.
The pVAR model has the following speciﬁcation:
yit = Ayit−1 + Bxit + μi + H
1/2
it εit (8)
where yit is a vector of endogenous variables for country i at time t (i.e. out-
put growth, inﬂation and banking sector stability), xit is a vector of exogenous
variables (i.e. oil prices), μi is a ﬁxed eﬀect for each country, εit is a vector
of independent error terms normally distributed and Hit is a country-speciﬁc
time-varying covariance matrix, which is function of a set of dependent vari-
ables zt−1 (see below).
To model Hit, we adopt a strategy similar to the conditional constant corre-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
as:








1 φi12 φi13 ··· φi1N
φi21 1 φi23 ··· φi2N
. . .
. . .
. . . ... . . .
φiN1 φiN2 φiN3 ··· 1
⎞





where φijk is a constant country-speciﬁc correlation coeﬃcient between vari-











it1 00 ··· 0
0 σ2
it2 0 ··· 0
. . .
. . .
. . . ... . . .










itn is the variance of residuals for country i at time t for the nth




itn =e x p ( αin + αnzit−1) (12)
where αin is a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁc to each country and αn is a common slope.
Note that zit can contain some or all variables in yit and xit.11



















where T is the number of periods, I is the number of countries and N is the




















The log likelihood can be estimated with traditional maximization techniques.
We use a multivariate version of the estimation methodology proposed by
Harvey (1976).
The model is estimated using GDP real growth, price level and oil price growth
rate data between 1980Q1 and 2008Q4 collected from Datastream. 8 Note that
we standardize 9 the distance-to-default for each country. With this, we elimi-
nate the diﬀerence in distance-to-default level and volatility between countries.
This is equivalent to assuming that, in each country, banking sector stability
is measured by the relative size of distance-to-default deviations from each
country historical mean. In other words, an unusually unstable banking sec-
tor corresponds to a distance-to-default that is unusually below the country
historical mean, in terms of historical standard deviations.
4.1 Linear impact of banking sector stability
4.1.1 Impact on real output growth
Table 1 displays the estimated coeﬃcients of the pVAR model with a lag of
two for the endogenous and the exogenous variables. 10 For clarity, only co-
eﬃcients related to the endogenous and exogenous variables are presented;
ﬁxed eﬀects are omitted. The estimated coeﬃcients show that the relation-
ship between banking sector stability and real output growth is a two way
relationship. Real output growth is important for subsequent stability and
similarly, banking sector stability is important for subsequent output growth.
In particular, our results indicate that higher growth is followed by greater
banking sector stability (column 2, row 1) and that banking sector stability
induces growth in the subsequent periods (column 1, rows 3 and 4).
8 We removed the seasonality component in price movement using the X12 method in Eviews.
9 A standardized variable is equal to its value subtracted from its mean and divided by its
standard deviation.
10 The number of lags has been chosen with the Akaike Information Criterion.12
Table 1
Linear impact of banking sector stability







GDPt−1 0.2035** 2.2104** -16.2861** -3.7156
GDPt−2 0.1982** 0.1754 -6.8144 11.0961**
DDt−1 0.0011** 0.9671** -0.3239** 0.6499**




*(**) indicates that the coeﬃcient at signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level. Level:
estimated coeﬃcients of equation (8) with GDP growth and banking sector’s
distance-to-default as endogenous variables and oil price yield as exogenous
variable. Variance: estimated coeﬃcients for equation (12) with GDP growth
and banking sector’s distance-to-default as independent variables.
The positive impact of banking sector stability on output growth is observable
from the impulse-response functions of the estimated pVAR (lower left-hand
side panel in Figure 3). Moreover, shocks (both to banking sector stability and
to output growth) are more persistent in their eﬀect on banking sector stability
than on output growth (right-hand side vs. left-hand side panels of Figure 3).
The impulse-response functions also show that the impact of a positive GDP
shock on the improvement of banking sector stability is long lasting.
Table 1 additionally presents the estimated coeﬃcients for the output growth
and banking sector stability variances. The results indicate that both the level
of output growth and banking sector stability have a signiﬁcant impact on their
own variance. Higher output growth is followed by lower output variance in
the following quarters (column 3, rows 1). In other words, uncertainty about
future output growth is smaller in booms than in recessions. 11 In contrast,
the variance of banking sector stability increases when the banking sectors
distance-to-default is high (column 4, rows 3 and 4). This signiﬁes that un-
certainty about future banking sector stability is higher during periods of
stability. Combined with the positive autocorrelation for the banking sector
described previously, our results imply that an unstable banking sector is more
likely to be followed by a further period of instability, than a stable banking
sector is to be followed by another period of stability.
Table 1 additionally shows that banking sector stability has a negative and
signiﬁcant impact on output growth variance (column 3, row 3). This means
that a stable banking sector is followed by reduced uncertainty about future
output growth. Combined with the positive link between banking sector sta-
bility and output growth, our ﬁndings indicate that a stable banking sector
11 This is in line with the negative link between variance and growth identiﬁed by Ramey and
Ramey (1995) and Fat´ as and Mihov (2003).13
Fig. 3. Impulse-response function for real output growth and banking
sector stability







































































































is more likely to be followed by high output growth, than an unstable bank-
ing sector is to be followed by low output growth. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that
higher uncertainty about the stability of the banking sector generally follows
higher output growth (column 4, row 2). Combined with the positive link
between output growth and banking sector stability, this means that, even-
though banking sectors are on average more stable after a growth in output,
the probability of observing a banking crisis is higher after a period of growth.
Figure 4 documents the behavior of output growth and banking sector stability
variances after shocks. The graph shows the diﬀerence between the average
variance with and without shocks. As explained previously, a positive shock
(to either output growth or to banking sector stability) reduces the variance
of output growth (left-hand side panels). A positive shock to banking sector
stability increases its own variance (right-hand side lower panel). Finally, a
shock to output growth increases banking sector stability variance (right-hand
side upper panel).14
Fig. 4. Impulse-response function for real output growth and banking
sector stability variance
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4.1.2 Impact on inﬂation
Table 2 presents the estimated pVAR with inﬂation and distance-to-default
as endogenous variables with a lag of 2. 12 It shows that neither inﬂation
nor banking sector stability has an impact on the other. The results for the
variance equations and for their impulse-response functions (Figure 5) show
that higher inﬂation increases the uncertainty about next period inﬂation,
but decreases the variance of distance-to-default after one period. Impulse-
response functions additionally show that the variance of inﬂation tends to
decrease for a very short period after a positive shock to banking sectors
degree of stability.
4.2 Non linear impact of the banking sector stability
In the previous section we showed that some empirical evidence of a linear
link between banking sector stability and the distribution of output growth
exists. However, some authors have suggested that the main impact of banking
sector stability on the real economy is non linear. In this section, we brieﬂy
12 The number of lag is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion.15
Table 2








Inflationt−1 1.0458** 0.0007 0.0623 0.1427**
Inflationt−2 -0.1237** -0.0080 0.1143* -0.1910**
DDt−1 -0.0487 0.9765** 0.2286** 0.5770**




*(**) indicates that the coeﬃcient at signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level. Level: estimated co-
eﬃcients of equation (8) with inﬂation and banking sector’s distance-to-default as endoge-
nous variables and oil price yield as exogenous variable. Variance: estimated coeﬃcients
for equation (12) with inﬂation and banking sector’s distance-to-default as independent
variables.
Fig. 5. Impulse-response function for inflation and banking sector sta-
bility variance
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investigate this possibility with a simple model.
Concretely, we check whether there is an asymmetric reaction of real output
growth and inﬂation to banking sector stability. Essentially, we assess whether
real output and inﬂation distributions are diﬀerent in periods following diﬀer-
ent state of banking sector stability. As per section 3, we deﬁne three states for16
Table 3








GDPt−1 0.1969** 4.0539** -17.0826** -2.2483
GDPt−2 0.2115** 3.2440** -8.3040* 7.0877
D1,t−1 -0.0019** -0.6422** 0.1445 -0.3709**
D1,t−2 0.0016** -0.3758** 0.3846** -1.2010**
D2,t−1 0.0008 1.1228** -0.2373 0.3551**




*(**) indicates that the coeﬃcient at signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level. Level: estimated co-
eﬃcients of equation (8) with inﬂation and banking sector’s distance-to-default as endoge-
nous variables and oil price yield as exogenous variable. Variance: estimated coeﬃcients
for equation (12) with inﬂation and banking sector’s distance-to-default as independent
variables.
the banking sector: unstable, stable and very stable. We say that the banking
sector is unstable if its (standardized) distance-to-default is in the ﬁrst 20
Similarly to the linear estimations, we make use of a panel VAR but we replace
the lagged distance-to-default of the right-hand side of equation (8) by two
dummy variables: D1,t, is equal to one when the banking sector is unstable
and zero otherwise; and D2,t, is equal to one when the banking sector is very
stable and zero otherwise.
Table 3 presents the estimated coeﬃcients of the new pVAR. The results for
the dummy variables are particularly interesting. They indicate that only un-
stable banking sectors have a signiﬁcant (and negative) impact on real output
growth. Particularly stable banking sectors have no impact on real output
growth. In contrary, both unstable and very stable banking sectors have a
signiﬁcant impact on real output growth variance.
Table 4 presents the estimated coeﬃcients of the non linear pVAR with inﬂa-
tion. The results are less clear than for the output growth, but it seems that
unstable banking sector increase slightly inﬂation (column 1, row 4).
The non linear model provides some interesting insights into the results from
the linear model for output growth. They show that the linear links uncovered
are predominantly driven by periods of banking sector instability rather than
by a smooth and continuous link between banking sector stability and the real
economy.17
Table 4








Inflationt−1 1.0497** -0.0173 0.0654 0.0386
Inflationt−2 -0.1259** 0.0043 0.1034 -0.0815
D1,t−1 -0.0757 -0.6516** 0.2017 -0.3533**
D1,t−2 0.0985* -0.3387** -0.0224 -1.0098**
D2,t−1 -0.0485 1.1281** -0.0161 0.2686*




*(**) indicates that the coeﬃcient at signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level. Level: estimated co-
eﬃcients of equation (8) with inﬂation and banking sector’s distance-to-default as endoge-
nous variables and oil price yield as exogenous variable. Variance: estimated coeﬃcients
for equation (12) with inﬂation and banking sector’s distance-to-default as independent
variables.
4.3 Expanding the set of macroeconomic variables
The model estimated in Section 4.1 is very simplistic since it makes the hy-
pothesis that real output is function of its lags, of banking sector stability and
of oil prices only. In reality, several other economic variables have an impact
on output growth. In this section, we extend the set of exogenous macroeco-
nomic variables included in the pVAR to capture their inﬂuence on real output
growth. More precisely, we add consumption growth rate (ΔCt), short term
interest rates (STIRt), money growth rate(ΔM2t) growth and investments
(ΔKt) in the sample. 13 We chose to present these results in a separate sec-
tion and not directly in the main section because the variables that we include
are not available for all the countries studied or for the same period. Indeed,
after adding these variables, the sample is reduced to 15 countries instead of
18 14 and the number of observation shrinks from 1757 data points to 1052.
Table 5 shows that real output growth and distance-to-default are still func-
tion of their own lag. As previously, real output growth is also dependent on
banking sector stability. However, and contrary to the results in Section 4.1,
banking sector stability does not depend on real output growth anymore. It is
still a function of the macroeconomic environment as banking sector stability
decrease for higher short term interest rates and higher investments (column
13 We chose variables that are likely to inﬂuence transitory business cycles of GDP (see e.g. Stock
and Watson, 1999) and not long term growth rates (like e.g. human capital, political environment,
etc...). The reasons for that is mainly that we are not interested in the long term structural inﬂuence
of the banking sector on growth but more in the transitory impact of the ﬂuctuation of its stability.
14 Australia, Greece and Sweden are missing from the initial sample.18
Table 5
Linear impact of banking sector stability







GDPt−1 0.2313** 2.2489 -12.5079* -14.8445**
GDPt−2 0.2032** -0.9067 -9.5655 0.3829
DDt−1 0.0008** 0.8984** -0.2344** 0.6176**








*(**) indicates that the coeﬃcient at signiﬁcant at the 5% (1%) level. Level:
estimated coeﬃcients of equation (8) with GDP growth and banking sector’s
distance-to-default as endogenous variables and oil price yield as exogenous
variable. Variance: estimated coeﬃcients for equation (12) with GDP growth
and banking sector’s distance-to-default as independent variables.
2, rows 9 and 11). Table 5 also shows that real output growth variance is
still a negative function of banking sector stability - i.e. uncertainty about
real output growth increases with banking sector instability. The introduction
of the new variables changes the results for distance-to-default variance: the
uncertainty about banking sector stability decreases with higher real output
growth.
5 Banking sector stability and central bank forecast errors
The link between banking stability and economic activity is of particular inter-
est to policy makers which base their monetary policy decisions on economic
forecasts. Our estimations above highlighted the importance of banking sector
stability on output growth, however, they were unable to identify any signif-
icant relationship between stability and inﬂation. We therefore extend our
analysis on banking sector stability and GDP growth by assessing whether
additional information embedded in our stability index might help to improve
output growth forecasts. We base our analysis on the United States since fore-
cast data is publicly available on the Fed website back to 1965 15 , up to a ﬁve
year delay. For comparability with our previous estimations our dataset that
consists of quarterly data from 1980 to 2001.
Despite econometric models playing an important role in Fed projections for
15 http://www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/forecast/greenbook-data/index.cfm.19
Table 6
Correlations: distance to default with fore-
cast errors
DD(C) DD(L1) DD(L2) DD(L3) DD(L4)
current -0.43** -0.46** -0.37** -0.33** -0.34**
one 0.09 -0.11 0.02 0.06 0.06
two 0.30** 0.34** 0.34** 0.31** 0.32**
three 0.18* 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.10
four 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04
ﬁve -0.10 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16
six 0.17 -0.14 0.13 0.17 0.16
seven -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
eight -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06
Note: *(**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level. Forecast errors are cal-
culated as the diﬀerence between actual and predicted GDP growth. On the
vertical axis, current, one... refer to the current forecast, the one-period ahead
forecast etc. DD(C), DD(L1), DD(L2) denote the current stability, stability with
a one period lag, stability with a two period lag.
macroeconomic growth, they serve only as part of an input into the forecast
process. Judgement based intervention, incorporating additional information
not grasped by the models, additionally play a vital role (see Reifschneider,
Stockton, and Wilcox, 1997). It is, however, unclear what information is in-
corporated and whether such judgment based adjustments to forecasts are
eﬃcient, i.e. whether they for example make eﬃcient use of all information
contained in banking sector variables. Since economic activity and interest
rates aﬀect ﬁnancial sector risks, and in turn, the ﬁnancial sector aﬀects the
real economy, it is possible that considering the state of the banking sector in
a systematic way would improve forecasts. We therefore investigate whether
Fed growth forecasts are indeed making use of information contained in our
measure of banking sector stability.
We start by computing simple correlations between the current distance to de-
fault and the period ahead forecasts. The correlations are presented in Table 6.
Correlations between the stability indicator and the forecast errors are signif-
icant for current forecasts as well as for two- and three-period ahead forecasts
indicating that some degree of association between these two measures exists.
Simple correlations, however, make no a priori assumptions as to whether one
variable is dependent on the other. We therefore proceed to describe the de-
pendence of forecast errors on the banking sector stability; implicitly assuming
that there is a one-way causal eﬀect from the degree of stability to the forecast
errors, regardless of whether the path of eﬀect is direct or indirect.
Our results are presented in Table 7. We ﬁnd that banking sector stability
has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the two-and three-period ahead Fed
forecasts. Since the forecast error is calculated as the diﬀerence between the
actual value and the forecasted rate, the result indicates that banking sector20
Table 7
Estimation: distance to default and Fed forecast errors
Dependent one-period two-period three-period four-period
variable: ahead forecast ahead forecast ahead forecast ahead forecast
LINEAR ESTIMATIONS
distance to default 0.04 0.08** 0.022* 0.02
NON LINEAR ESTIMATIONS
D1 0.28 0.61** 0.38* 0.10
D2 -0.54 -0.23 -0.01 -0.02
Note: *(**) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level. Forecast errors are calculated as the
diﬀerence between actual and predicted GDP growth. D1 and D2 are dummies capturing
distance to default in the ﬁrst and last quartile respectively.
stability today results in a signiﬁcant underestimation of GDP growth the
subsequent quarters. Essentially, banking sector stability brings more growth
than expected. This ﬁnding indicates that additional information embedded in
our stability index measure has the potential to improve Fed growth forecasts.
We additionally experiment with asymmetric eﬀects in this regard, deﬁning
periods of instability, stability and high stability as per section 3. The results
are presented in the lower panel of Table 7. The results from the non linear
estimation further conﬁrm our previous ﬁnding that for the two-period (and
three-period) ahead forecasts, instability drives the results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the relationship between banking sector stability
and the subsequent evolution of real output growth and inﬂation. Capturing
the stability of a banking sector by building an index based on banking sector
distance to default, we adopt a panel VAR methodology to assess both linear
and non linear relationships between our variables of interest. We show that
banking sector stability appears to be an important driver of GDP growth.
Periods of stability are generally followed by an increase in real output growth,
while instability corresponds with subsequent periods of reduced growth. We
also show that a stable banking sector reduces real output growth uncertainty.
In addition, we explore the possibility of an asymmetric impact of banking sec-
tor stability on the real economy. To do this we distinguish between unstable,
stable and very stable periods relative to both historical and international
average. We ﬁnd that the relationship is asymmetric in nature, in that it is
driven predominantly by periods of instability.
We further extend the analysis to assess whether additional information em-21
bedded in our stability index might help to improve central bank growth fore-
casts. Focussing on data from the Fed, we show that output forecast errors
are correlated with our stability measure. Our ﬁndings indicate that banking
sector stability (instability) results in a signiﬁcant underestimation (overes-
timation) of GDP growth in the subsequent quarters. This result is in line
with the notion that additional information, embedded in our stability index
measure, has the potential to further improve economic forecasts.
Our ﬁndings have several important implications for policy makers. First, we
show that for a sample of 18 countries, banking sector stability appears to be
an important driver of GDP growth in subsequent periods, highlighting the
need for greater attention to be paid to banking sector soundness in the imple-
mentation of economic policy. In addition, we ﬁnd that additional information
contained in our banking sector measure could help forecasters to reduce fore-
cast errors, highlighting the need for policy makers to consider banking sector
measures in their forecast models.
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